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DEATH AS A LOSS
Brian Sayers

In this paper I describe and argue against two positions. The first, espoused by Epicurus
and other philosophers, contends that in permanent death, since there is no longer a
subject, my own death cannot be a loss for me. I argue that this thesis makes an illicit
assumption and itself embodies a conceptual confusion. Therefore, my death can after
all have the logical status of a loss for me. The Christian Church, however, has adopted
what I call the ··official" position; namely, that while my death could be a loss for me,
if I am a believer, it must instead be considered a gain. Against this claim, T urge the
adoption of a contrary "unofficial" position which argues that even as a believer my death
may be a loss for me. I contend that the "official" position embodies internal incoherence
and promotes a corrupt version of Christianity. The "unofficial" position, however, is
compatible with Christian teaching on self-mortification and more accurately represents
New Testament attitudes towards death. Thereby T conclude that regarding my death as
loss to myself is neither conceptually absurd nor a failure of faith.

What is my death to me? Apparently for many people their own death is something
to be feared, resisted, avoided. It is considered a great loss, possibly the greatest
loss of all. As Schopenhauer has noted, people will cling tenaciously to life even
when their situation is utterly miserable and hopeless. Tolstoi speaks for the
masses when he writes:
Ivan Ilych saw that he was dying, and he was in continual despair.'
Although not in despair, I am inclined to consider my death a significant loss;
not just for others, but myself as well. Yet, on two fronts, I am discouraged
from thinking this.
First, thinkers as disparate as Epicurus, Lucretius, Shakespeare, and Wittgenstein argue that it makes no sense to consider one's own death as a loss to
oneself, since after death there is no existing subject for whom there can be such
a loss. Where there is no traveller there is no journey, and where there is no
person there can be no loss. From this position, then, there is nothing to deplore
about one's own death per se, nor anything for which it is appropriate to feel
remorse, fear, or regret.
Second, while Christendom~ holds that the subject does survive physical death,
and thus could logically experience death as a loss, it denies that for believers
death is something evil. Rather death is but a doorway into a better existence;
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it is gain, not loss. As the Apostle put it, "For me to live is Christ, and to die
is gain." (Philippians 1:21) Consequently, regarding my death as a loss to myself
would constitute a failure of faith.
However, in this paper I shall argue that both of these positions are mistaken,
that a rational attitude towards one's own death would be neither indifference
nor anticipation. I shall argue that even if my death were a permanent death it
could still be a loss to me, and that even if Christianity is true, death would still
be a loss to the believer.
In his Letter to Menoceus, Epicurus asserts that a fear of death 3 embodies a
conceptual confusion:
So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us since so long as
we exist, death is not with us; but when death occurs, then we do not
exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for
the former it is not, and the latter are no more.·
It is the recognition of this conceptual confusion which unites the above-mentioned thinkers in their insistence that my death is not properly a loss to me.
Rosenberg characterizes this confusion as a conflation of two sensible concepts
which when conjoined produce "logical hash." That is, it does make sense to
speak of (a) me experiencing death (I am present at someone else's death), and
(b) experiencing my death (someone else is present at my death). But it makes
no sense to speak of me experiencing my death. (5) When there is no me, there
is no possibility of me experiencing anything, including my own death. Thinking
otherwise is possible only when one has confused the two legitimate concepts
and lumped them together indiscriminately. Lucretius concurs in this thought
when he writes:
For, if by chance there is to be grief and pain for a man, he must needs
himself to exist at that time, that ill may befall him. Since death forestalls
this, and prevents the being of him on whom these misfortunes might
crowd, we may know that we have nought to fear in death, and he who
is no more cannot be wretched. . . . (6)
Shakespeare joins this group in depicting death as non-experience, in the following haunting image of old age approaching death:
... and his big manly voice
Turning again toward childish treble, pipes
And whistles in his sound. Last scene of all,
That ends this strange eventful history
Is second childishness and mere oblivionSans teeth, sans eye, sans taste, sans everything. 7
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And finally, D. Z. Phillips, under the influence of the early Wittgenstein ("Death
is not an event in life. We do not live to experience death." 8), sums this point
up as well as anyone:
Death is not an experience, but the end of all experience, and one cannot
experience the end of experience. 9
And thus we reach the conclusion that my death cannot have the logical status
of an evil or loss for me. I may think that it is something dreadful or something
welcome, but I can only think this because I am not thinking clearly. Insofar as
my ignorance is removed I would be compelled to say with Epicurus, "Death
is nothing to me." So, while philosophy may not help me bear the toothache,
it should eliminate the fear of death for me.
Now, the first thing to notice about this position is that it has been very careful
to distinguish between death and dying, between experiencing death and
anticipating death, between fear of death and fear of some common accompaniments of dying (i.e. pain, isolation, the unknown). Rosenberg, for instance,
does not deny that one could properly fear dying, currently regard one's future
death as unwelcome, and in general hope that one's own death is neither soon
nor painful. These are legitimate distinctions and serve to reveal that when some
authors apparently talk sensibly about death as a loss, they are really discussing
dying. 10
The second point to note about this position, however, is that much of it is
directed against a purely imaginary opponent. Epicurus is entirely correct to
point out that, given a permanent death, then, at that time there is no subject
for whom death could be a loss. A corpse is but dust and dust cannot suffer loss.
But who would ever deny this? When confronted with the ghost of Christmas
future, when presented with his own tombstone in place over his corpse, when
made aware of the lack of sorrow at his death, should Scrooge have dismissed
the ghost with the retort that at that time he would not care? Was Tolstoi guilty
merely of a logical blunder when he found his mortality an ever-present threat
which devoured his life of its former satisfactions? I think not.
While it is true that Tolstoi and others have not sharply distinguished between
dying and death, it does seem that dying itself was not their problem. Were
dying not followed by death they would not have been so distressed. II It was
death, their future death, that was the object of their attention. And to suggest
that they bemoan their fate by virtue of a conceptual confusion seems far too easy.
Suppose we grant that death is permanent and so at death I am no longer an
experiencing subject. Then it will be true that while I can experience my own
dying, I cannot experience my own death. However, Epicurus proceeds from
this premise directly to the conclusion that my own death cannot ever be a loss
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to me. And this is quite a leap. Now, I can see how this conclusion is supposed
to follow. It would follow, for instance, if one accepted a general principle that
an event of which I could not be aware could not be a loss for me, either now
or later. However, I do not see what reason there could be for accepting this
general principle. It seems easy enough to find plenty of counterexamples to it.
Let us suppose, for instance, that a formerly intelligent adult has suffered
brain damage and now possesses the mental abilities of a two year old. His
physical needs are met in an institution and he is not suffering, in fact seems
very cheerful and contented most of the time. Here we have an example of an
event (or state) of which the intelligent adult is not, and could not be aware. He
currently does not consider his reduced state to be a loss for himself. The question,
however, is not whether he currently regards his situation as a loss for himself,
but whether it is a loss for him. And this, in tum, reduces to the more general
question of what it is that makes an event good or evil for a human.
Clearly, the position I have been examining contends that it is the current
state of an individual that determines the good or evil of an event. So, when I
experience my normal minor hunger at mealtime, raw horseflesh is not a good
to me. On the verge of starvation, however, I might consider such food a good,
even a great good. On this view, then, in death there will be no subject, therefore
no current state of a subject, therefore nothing that could be considered good or
evil. This is why Epicurus insists that death should be "nothing to us."
And yet, the brain-damage example casts some doubt on the claim that good
and evil must be restricted to the state of a subject at a given time. It does not
seem conceptually absurd to regard the two year old adult as having himself
suffered a misfortune. He has lost something, whether or not he is aware of it.
It is because of such possibilities as dementia that Nagel contends:
A man is the subject of good and evil as much because he has hopes
which mayor may not be fulfilled, or possibilities which mayor may
not be realized, as because of his capacity to suffer and enjoy. If death
is an evil, it must be accounted for in these terms and the impossibility
of locating it within life should not trouble US. 12
These considerations suggest that Epicurus' position has itself failed to make a
crucial distinction. It has conflated the concept of a loss with that of afelt loss.
It has assumed that because a loss is not felt that it cannot really be a loss at
all. And this seems wrong, simply false. Merely because one cannot locate a
current sense of loss one is not entitled to conclude that no loss has been suffered.
According to Rousseau, people born in chains have lost their desire for freedom.
The:y do not know it, but they have suffered a loss. Likewise, an adult reduced
to the life of a cheerful infant has suffered a loss. He has lost the ability, for
instance to participate in many activities which formerly were enjoyable and
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significant for him. Nagel seems right on this point. Deprivation of future
possibilities, especially when they would be continuations of previous
activities, may be considered as loss.
By analogy, then, a person who has died a permanent death, even though
now unaware of his state, can also properly be spoken of as having suffered
a loss. So, if the Rousseau and brain-damage examples may be considered
as losses for the subjects involved, and if there is sufficient strength in the
analogy between those examples and death, then there is no logical barrier
to considering my death as a loss to me.
One might argue against the first point by contending that the formerly
intelligent adult, for instance, is no longer the same subject, so there is no
loss for him, felt or otherwise. Yet this response -as is well known- threatens
to overpopulate us with subjects. In the case of Alzheimer's disease, where
the mind gradually deteriorates, we would have to posit possibly hundreds
of subjects, one having existed for perhaps sixty years, subsequent ones
merely a week or two. So, in the face of such unresolved difficulties, I
believe that I am on firmer ground logically to invoke Occam's razor. Rather
than saying "He is not the same person (or subject, or whatever), and so
he has suffered no loss." I should say instead, "He has suffered a loss
although he does not know it."J3
And so the second point remains. Is there sufficient strength in the analogy
between brain damage and death? Of course, there are differences. In the
first case there still exists a subject even though unaware of his loss. In the
second case, we have presently no subject at all; we have a corpse. But for
the point we are considering this difference is irrelevant. I am not claiming
that the corpse could be pitied any more than I am claiming that a contented
infant (although adult in body) should be pitied. It is the intelligent adult
who has been reduced to infancy that has suffered the loss, and it is the
person who has died that has lost possibilities which he would otherwise
still have had.
Unless the question is being begged, the current status of the individual
being considered is not germane. What is germane is that in each case,
while possibilities have been precluded, no loss is felt. And on this point,
which is the one at issue, the examples are similar. And so the tests of an
analogy seem to have been met. Relevant similarities exist, and differences
that obtain are not relevant to the point of the analogy.
Consequently, I contend that the analogy between brain-damage and death
is strong enough to be used in an argument. My argument proceeds from
the premise that an adult who has experienced severe brain damage has
suffered a loss even though this loss cannot be located in a current state of
his life. We may properly attribute a loss to him even though he does not
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"experience" the loss as a loss. Following Nagel, I argue that the loss consists
in the loss of possibilities, relationships, and activities which he would have
continued to enjoy had he not suffered this loss. As it is with the brain
damage case, so it is with death. They are analogous in this respect. So I
conclude that there remains no logical barrier to considering my death as a
loss to me. To think otherwise is to make the illicit assumption that a loss
must be a felt loss.
From another angle, the general teaching of Christendom would concur
in my contention that it does make sense to consider my death as something
that could be good or evil for me. More specifically, it teaches that if I am
a believer, then my death, while it could have been a loss, is not in fact.
Instead it is a gain or victory. It is in this sense that we have another claim
that my death is not a loss to me. And again, we have a position which I
shall argue is indefensible.
Throughout its history the Christian Church has tried to impress upon
unbelieving humans a fear of death. 14 Whether to provoke repentance, or to
exact obedience to (allegedly) Scriptural requirements, one's own death was
a day of reckoning. Wrong acts, wrong attitudes, wrong beliefs would all
come to light and would be punished appropriately. "Be not deceived, God
is not mocked. Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." (Galatians
6:7) It was because death could be the loss that the death-bed scene assumed
such awesome significance in Medieval Christianity. It became the place of
the last struggle to avoid the judgement of God.
However, for the believer, the situation was to be quite different. While
it was true that death was a great enemy, the power of death derived from
man's own sinful acts. The effects of these sinful acts, though, could be
cancelled by the intervention of Jesus performing His salvific acts. So now,
for the believer, death was a defeated foe. Death was not a true end, but
rather the beginning of a much superior life. Rather than dreadful judgement,
death became a glorious triumph. The Medieval assertion that death was
better than life (mors melior vita) was the logical outcome of such Scriptural
claims as the following:
A good name is better than precious ointment: and the day of death
than the day of one's birth." (Ecclesiastes 7:1)
For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. (Philippians 1:21)
... Death is swallowed up in victory. 0 death, where is thy sting? 0
grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin; and the strength
of sin is the law. But thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory
through our Lord Jesus Christ" (I Corinthians 15: 54-57)
It is this attitude, that death should not be feared, that it was not at all properly
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regarded as a loss for a person of faith, to which I shall refer as the "official"
position. The unbeliever properly feared, but for a believer, to regard death as
a loss was "officially" a failure of faith.
Since the teaching of the Church was thus double-sided about death, we would
expect believers (nominal and otherwise) to possess ambivalent attitudes towards
their own death. And while we do possess records of some believers who welcomed death, 15 we also have discovered more recently that fear of death is not
appreciably diminished by religious belief. 15 However, I am not concerned with
what attitudes Christians have actually possessed on this issue. My interest is
in showing that the "official" position of Christendom, contrary to initial appearances, cannot support itself from within.
From within it certainly looks as though death cannot be a loss for a genuine
Christian. Given the resurrection of the dead, the forgiveness of one's sins, the
promise of heaven, and the nature of this life as a vale of tears, it seems to
follow that a logically consistent attitude towards one's own death would be one
of glad anticipation, not remorse.
Of course, if the notion of personal survival after death is incoherent, or if
salvation doctrine cannot be accepted, then these constitute serious external
attacks on the "official" position of Church teaching on death. However, I shall
ignore such external attacks, and concentrate instead on problems which can be
generated from within a Christian perspective. (17) More specifically, I propose
to explore the ramifications of an "unofficial" but Scriptural attitude towards
death. Thereby, I hope to show that the "official" position commits a serious
distortion of its own sources and should be replaced.
First of all, Jesus' death and resurrection is considered a source of celebration
and victory. It is the basis for the believer's triumph over the grave. So attitudes
towards His death are crucial for the "official" position.
However, it is clear that Jesus' death is considered to be the most amazing,
the most incredible sacrifice on his part. 18 It is not that He submitted to inconvenience, or pain, or hunger, or persecution, or rejection, but that he submitted to
death which is emphasized by Paul and which is to arouse feelings of awe and
gratitude. 19
Furthermore, His own death was significant and repugnant to Jesus Himself.
It seems to be death from which He shrank in the Garden of Gethsemane and
death which was the "bitter cup" which He would have preferred to decline.
(Luke 22:41-44)
At the same time, it is death which is often cited as a metaphor for what
happens when one becomes a Christian. One is to pick up His cross and "die"
to sin. (Romans 6:2) That is, to become a Christian requires self-mortification.
Now, while this metaphorical death is intended to bespeak a radical break with
one's former life, it is also used to indicate the cost involved in such a switch
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of allegiance. A Christian could not live as he used to live. He had to leave
possessions, family, and old comforts. Thus, when the fathers of the Church
w,mted to highlight this loss incurred in becoming a Christian they chose their
most dramatic analogue - they chose death as representative of this loss. In order
to "know" Christ a believer had to become "conformable to His death" (Philippians 3:10), a phrase which is used in the context of insisting on the rigors of
the Christian life.
But not only is salvation analagous to death, it is also considered as deliverance
from death.20 It is clear that the disciples and other followers of Jesus were most
pleased when they believed that some of them would not "see death" but escape
it altogether. 21 Apparently, then, death is still represented as a loss in the New
Testament.
Kierkegaard effectively captures this "unofficial" Christian attitude towards
death in a late journal entry:
Of all torments, being a Christian is the most terrible; it is-and that is
how it should be-to know hell in this life.
What is a human being most terrified of? Most likely of dying, and
most of all of the death-agony, therefore wishing it to be as brief as
possible. But to be a Christian means to be in a state of dying--(you
must die off, hate yourself)-and yet, after that, you have to live on,
maybe for 40 years, in that state. (We shudder to read about the sufferings
a beast undergoes when it is used for vivisection; yet this gives only a
glimmering of the pain involved in being a Christian: to be kept alive
in a state of death.)
That is not all, however; there is a further aggravation. Those who
surround a dying man's couch do not generally guffaw loudly at him
because he groans in his last agony. Nor do they usually hate, curse,
or loathe him because of that. But this torment forms an integral part
of being a Christian; it comes along whenever true Christianity is to be
expressed in this world. 22
And so, we have set up a rather damaging internal attack on the "official"
position. The only way to reject this attack is to reject the suggestion that
becoming a Christian costs the new believer. But such a move would have
unacceptable consequences for Christians. If death is not to be considered a loss
then a central metaphor of New Testament teaching (written, after all, to believers)
is devoid of meaning. If death is not a loss then it cannot be much of a bother
to "die to sin."
So I conclude that the "official" position has illicitly downplayed the significance of the believer's death.
Further, even if many believers have been unable to consider their 0wn death
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with the approved equanimity, this position has had considerable ill effect in
Western civilization. I suspect, for instance, that Kierkegaard was correct in his
suggestion that Christendom has cheapened Christianity, and done so partly by
its concomitant insistence that death is no loss. Hegel, Feurerbach, and Nietzsche
have noted the tendency of Christendom to empty this world of significance and
worth but could have made their points more trenchantly by indicating the role
that the "official" position on death has played. Then too, it is possible that the
"official" position has aided Western civilization in its currently lamented propensity to deny the reality of death. The claim that death is no loss could be
part of an elaborate refusal to face the fear that it inspires. But these are merely
speculations or suggestions for further study and not part of my argument.
Whatever the historical causes and effects of the "official" position, I believe
that its logical defects may now be pointed out more precisely.
I would like to suggest that Christendom has entertained a confusion similar
to that inherent in the Epicurus/Phillips/Rosenberg position on death. That is, it
seems to me that the Church has overlooked a rather obvious distinction between
an utter loss, and a loss simpliciter. It seems to have omitted the notion that a
loss which issues in some gain may still be properly considered a loss. A man
who has grown from childhood into an adult has lost his childhood, and whether
he misses it or not, he has still lost something. Similarly, a person who loses
his naivete, his virginity, his innocence, his former ignorance, has-while gaining
something-also suffered a loss. Even cultures, moving for instance, from an
agricultural to a technological life-style, have lost one thing while they have
gained another.
So, there is no good reason, although this may have been feared, to think that
acknowledging the loss will detract from the gain. Instead, even if shorn of its
terrors, even if it is the gateway to a life without sorrow and injustice, for
instance, death may still deprive a believer of many enjoyable and significant
activities. 23 Christendom loses its credibility, and needlessly, by insisting otherwise.
Consequently, the widespread inability of believers to approach their death
with utter equanimity or even gladness, is not, after all, a failure of faith.
Understanding the relationship between the cost of becoming a Christian and
the loss incurred in death, prohibits a believer from genuinely adopting the
"otficial" position. We can be glad of this, for as Emily Dickinson puts it,
Believing what we don't believe
Does not exhilarate. 24
Returning to Kierkegaard's point, then, I recommend that the "unofficial"
position be adopted instead. Notwithstanding other aspects of the situation, to
be a Christian is to suffer; and to die is to suffer loss.
Houghton College, NY
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